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Jeramie D. Scott 
Social Media and Government Surveillance: The 
Case for Better Privacy Protections for Our Newest 
Public Space 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Social media sites are public space and government mass surveillance of this public 
space undermines our democracy. As we spend more and more of our lives on 
digital mediums, the government is monitoring publicly available social media data 
more than ever.1 At the same time, the Internet, particularly social media, has 
become an important public space to exercise First Amendment rights. 
Roughly two-thirds of Americans use social media accounts.2 People use social 
media to share ideas, explore new ideas, and engage those with similar and 
dissimilar ideas. Additionally, social media has become a key tool of social 
movements like the Occupy Movement and Black Lives Matter.3 
This Essay will examine the government’s use of social media monitoring 
services to collect, monitor, and analyze social media data for the purposes of 
fighting crime and terrorism. After explaining the use of social media monitoring,4 I 
will examine the importance of “privacy in public.”5 Following, I will discuss the 
dangers of this monitoring and the lack of legal protection.6 In conclusion, I will 
offer the necessary actions that must be taken to protect our privacy and ultimately 
our First Amendment rights in an age of social media monitoring.7 
 
© 2017 Jeramie D. Scott 
        EPIC’s National Security Counsel and Director of EPIC’s Domestic Surveillance Project. 
 1.  Map: Social Media Monitoring by Police Departments, Cities, and Counties, BRENNAN CENTER FOR 
JUSTICE (Nov. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Brennan Center Map], https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/map-
social-media-monitoring-police-departments-cities-and-counties.  
 2.  Shea Bennett, 67% of Americans Use Social Media (With One in Six Active on Twitter), AD WEEK: 
SOCIAL TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/social-media-america/497615. 
 3.  See, e.g., Bijan Stephen, Social Media Helps Black Lives Matter Fight the Power, WIRED MAG. (Nov. 
2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-matter-uses-social-media-to-fight-the-power. 
 4.  See infra Part II. 
 5.  See infra Part III. 
 6.  See infra Parts IV–V. 
 7.  See infra Part VI. 
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II. SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING SOFTWARE 
With the rise of social media, many companies now provide social media 
monitoring software that the government can use to sift through the vast amount of 
data created by social media. Digital Stakeout,8 Beware,9 Geofeedia,10 LifeRaft11 are 
just some of the names of the products provided for monitoring social media. These 
products are used by the federal government as well as local and state governments 
to aggregate, filter, and analyze billions of data points created across social media 
platforms every day.12 Even the Central Intelligence Agency’s venture capital firm, 
IN-Q-TEL, is investing heavily in companies that are working on software tools to 
mine the vast amount of social media data.13 
Social media monitoring software is used in a variety of ways to analyze the “big 
data” derived from collecting social media information. The software is not just 
used to look for keywords,14 but also to track the location from which social media 
posts are coming,15 identify relationships between people,16 monitor events,17 and 
determine an individual’s potential for violence,18 among many other functions. 
The social media monitoring software known as Beware has been used by the 
Fresno, California police to data mine publicly available records, including social 
media, to produce “threat scores” that predict “the suspect’s potential for 
violence.”19 Threat scores are color-coded as green, yellow, or red with red being the 
highest threat.20 
 
 8.  DIGITALSTAKEOUT, http://www.digitalstakeout.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2017). 
 9.  Beware, WEST, https://www.west.com/safety-services/public-safety/powerdata/beware (last visited Feb. 
15, 2017). 
 10.  GEOFEEDIA, https://geofeedia.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 11.  LIFERAFT, http://liferaftinc.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 12.  See Brennan Center Map, supra note 1. 
 13.  Lee Fang, The CIA is Investing in Firms that Mine Your Tweets and Instagram Photos, THE INTERCEPT 
(Apr. 14, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/04/14/in-undisclosed-cia-investments-social-media-mining-
looms-large.  
 14.  See generally Features, SIGNAL, http://www.getsignal.info/features (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Corporate Security, LIFERAFT http://liferaftinc.com/Solutions/Corporate-Intel (last visited Mar. 2, 
2017). 
 17.  Nate Anderson, How the Cops Watch Your Tweet in Real-Time, ARS TECHNICA (Sep. 15 2013), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/how-the-cops-watch-your-tweets-in-real-time (explaining how 
the Bluejay program allows police to monitor and locate, in real-time, public tweets). 
 18.  See Beware, supra note 9. 
 19.  Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat “Score,” WASH. POST 
(Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-are-surveilling-you-
calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html. 
 20.  Id. 
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A number of law enforcement authorities have tracked the Black Lives Matter 
movement through social media monitoring. Authorities in Oregon used social 
media monitoring software to track Black Lives Matter hashtags.21 The Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has collected information about the movement 
from various social media accounts including Facebook and Twitter.22 Mall of 
America Security scraped information from social media accounts to build dossiers 
on Black Lives Matter activists.23 
Social media monitoring software ingests a vast amount of data from a number 
of different types of accounts, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, 
Google+, Foursquare, Reddit, Vine, Tumblr, Periscope, and several others.24 
Geofeedia is a location focused monitoring software that, according to its website, 
helps “[d]iscover trends and patterns within the world’s largest set of location-based 
social data to inform better decision-making.”25 Bluejay markets itself as a “Twitter 
crime scanner” that allows the user to monitor high profile events.26 
This rise in social media monitoring allows law enforcement to now conduct a 
“virtual stakeout” of everything happening in the public space of social media. This 
level of surveillance is chilling and undermines our First Amendment protected 
rights and compromises our democracy. The public availability of so much data 
requires us to rethink privacy in public and implement the protections necessary to 
preserve our freedoms. 
III.  IMPORTANCE OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC     
The concept of “privacy in public” can seem like an oxymoron at first glance, but 
the concept is absolutely essential in a well-functioning democracy.  Privacy in 
public allows for self-realization;27 supports the freedom of thought28 and 
associational rights;29 and prevents conformity of thought and the chilling of 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter Since Ferguson, THE INTERCEPT 
(July 24, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/07/24/documents-show-department-homeland-security-
monitoring-black-lives-matter-since-ferguson. 
 23.  Lee Fang, Mall of America Security Catfished Black Lives Matter Activists, Documents Show, THE 
INTERCEPT (Mar. 18, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/03/18/mall-americas-intelligence-analyst-catfished-
black-lives-matter-activists-collect-information. 
 24.  See, e.g., DIGITALSTAKEOUT supra note 8. 
 25.  GEOFEEDIA, supra note 10. 
 26.  Anderson, supra note 17. 
 27.  See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 37 (1976) (“I shall 
myself argue that the right to privacy is fundamentally connected to personhood.”). 
 28.  Id. at 39. 
 29.  Id. 
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speech,30 thus protecting the “free market of ideas” that is vital for proper 
democratic discourse. 
Traditional theories of privacy have focused on “securing intimate and personal 
realms.”31 The focus was on actual threats to privacy.32 Not until the rise of 
information technology and databases was there a perceived threat to privacy in 
public.33 Privacy in public was traditionally protected by economic and 
technological limitations that made public information largely obscure. 
In an age before information technology, it would have been extremely hard to 
collect, analyze, and retain large amounts of public information over a long period 
of time of just one person, let alone millions. Aggregating disparate public records 
and surveilling the public activities of one individual would take a great deal of 
manpower. The practical obscurity of public information meant large scale 
surveillance of the public was a minimal concern at best, but the loss of this 
obscurity has made indiscriminate mass surveillance an everyday occurrence. 
This idea of privacy through obscurity has been applied to the online realm. 
Woodrow Hartzog and Frederick Stutzman proposed determining online obscurity 
based on four factors: search visibility, unprotected access, identification, and 
clarity.34 In the Hartzog/Stutzman framework, the presence of these factors 
decreases any claim to obscurity.35 Accordingly, the absence of these factors 
increases obscurity.36 This framework for obscurity, and others, tend to leave no 
room to protect the privacy in public of online data, (e.g. social media posts) that 
are widely available and lack some element restricting the information or the 
identity of the poster from the public. Joel Reidenberg has used obscurity as a 
starting point to understand the loss of privacy in public. 
Reidenberg describes this loss of practical obscurity in three stages: (1) obscurity, 
(2) accessibility, and (3) transparency.37 The obscurity stage precedes mass 
deployment of information technologies and preserves privacy in public through 
the sheer difficulty and cost of more traditional surveillance (i.e. surveillance that 
requires significant manpower).38 The accessibility stage implements the technology 
that makes personal information accessible to the public.39 Think of the ubiquity of 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  See Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information Technology, 
7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207, 207 (1997). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 142 (2014). 
 34.  Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 35–40 
(2013). 
 35.  Id. at 4. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Reidenberg, supra note 33. 
 38.  Id. at 148. 
 39.  Id. at 148–49. 
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cameras from CCTV to cellphones in everyone’s hands that can take pictures and 
record video. The digitization of public records would be another example. The 
transparency stage takes all this newly accessible information and makes it 
conspicuous through technologies like search engines or social media sites. 
It is social media that often exposes us to all the information that is now readily 
accessible, thus making it transparent. An enormous number of pictures and video 
are posted on sites like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and other social media sites. 
These social media posts expose what was once completely obscure and 
inaccessible. But, social media monitoring is arguably an example of a fourth stage 
to Reidenberg’s loss of practical obscurity— “analysis.”40 
Beyond removing the obscurity to public information and making it accessible 
and transparent, social media monitoring takes that information and analyzes it to 
derive additional informational value from the large amount of personal 
information that is now available. 
In the age of mass social media monitoring, our concept of obscurity and privacy 
in public needs to expand. Privacy in public is vital to our democracy.  In the 
context of the online public spaces created by social media, I do not intend for 
privacy in public to mean the restriction of access to posted material. Additionally, I 
do not intend for privacy in public to mean some level of purposeful obscurity by 
the individual posting on social media. The privacy in public for social media I am 
advocating means there is no government-coordinated mass surveillance to 
indiscriminately analyze and assess all social media including what was said, who 
said it, and the associations of the social media poster in an attempt to draw 
conclusions about the speaker regarding criminal or national security threats. We 
must allow the space for social media users and posts to enjoy a sort of practical 
obscurity obtained by the sheer volume of social media data available. It is this 
practical obscurity that will allow the “market place of ideas” to thrive in our digital 
world. 
Where we allow our digital public spaces, i.e. social media, to become bastions of 
mass surveillance we will see a slow degrade of public discourse. Indeed, to a certain 
extent, we have already seen that. Since the Snowden revelations, more and more 
individuals have either taken steps to shield their online information from the 
government or self-censored what they discuss in online public forums. A Pew 
survey found that 34% of adults who have become aware of the surveillance 
programs have taken steps to shield their information from the government.41  This 
 
 40.  See Jouvenal, supra note 19 (using social media monitoring program to analyze “billions of data 
points, including arrest reports, property records, commercial databases, deep Web searches and [a] man’s 
social- media postings” to calculate a suspect’s threat level). 
 41.  Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 
16, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/Americans-Privacy-Strategies-Post-Snowden. 
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includes changing social media privacy settings, using social media less, and 
avoiding certain terms in online communications.42 
A report by PEN America, which surveyed nearly 800 writers around the world 
about surveillance and self-censorship, found that: 
Writers living in liberal democratic countries have begun to engage in self-
censorship at levels approaching those seen in non-democratic countries, 
indicating that mass surveillance has badly shaken writers’ faith that 
democratic governments will respect their rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression, and that—because of pervasive surveillance—writers are 
concerned that expressing certain views even privately or researching certain 
topics may lead to negative consequences.43  
The PEN America report also found that over 1/3 of writers hailing from free 
countries outside the U.S. thought that freedom of expression was less protected in 
the U.S. compared to their own country.44 Additionally, large portions of the writers 
surveyed have limited their social media activities or avoided social media 
altogether.45  
As social media monitoring increases and becomes more sophisticated and the 
mass surveillance of public spaces increases, it will have a detrimental impact on our 
democracy. 
IV.  SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING: A LURKING DANGER FOR OUR 
SOCIETY 
The mass surveillance and analysis of publicly available data, particularly social 
media data, has far reaching implications for society. Social media monitoring 
threatens to limit our associations, chill our speech, and generally target those 
engaged in First Amendment protected activities. 
The implications of social media monitoring are particularly dangerous for 
minorities and those who express unpopular views. The capabilities of social media 
monitoring have already been directed towards the Black Lives Matter movement.46 
#BlackLivesMatter has become a well-recognized social media hashtag associated 
with the movement. The hashtag is used to communicate to supporters about 
breaking news, real-time actions, or upcoming events.47 The Black Lives Matter 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  PEN AMERICAN CENTER, GLOBAL CHILLING: THE IMPACT OF MASS SURVEILLANCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
WRITERS 1, 5 (2016), www.pen.org/sites/default/files/globalchilling_2015.pdf. 
 44.  Id. at 13. 
 45.  Id. at 10. 
 46.  See Joseph, supra note 22. 
 47.  Stephen, supra note 3. 
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movement is not one that resides under one monolithic institution but is a more 
diffused movement that is facilitated by the social media technologies of today.48 
This heavy use of social media has also made it a target of social media 
monitoring.49 The Department of Homeland Security began monitoring Black Lives 
Matter when the protests in Ferguson began and collected information “from 
public social media accounts, including on Facebook, Twitter, and Vine, even 
for events expected to be peaceful.”50 This is also not the first time DHS has engaged 
in social media monitoring. Documents previously obtained by the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) showed that DHS previously contracted with 
General Dynamics to monitor, in general, the news, specifically social media, for 
any reports that reflected badly on DHS or the U.S. Government.51 
Social media monitoring turns those exercising their First Amendment rights 
into targets of government surveillance, and such surveillance will have a chilling 
effect.52 Unfortunately, the law is currently of little help to prevent this kind of 
widespread surveillance of social media. This legal vacuum is exacerbated by the 
fact that the government often outsources social media monitoring to the private 
sector. These companies are often very secretive about the methods they use for 
social media monitoring, the vastness of their collection, and the algorithms they 
use to analyze all the data they ingest from the monitoring of social media.53 Such 
secrecy prevents the public from understanding the extent of the monitoring of 
social media, whether the algorithms produce bias results, or even if the social 
media monitoring is effective by any measure. 
V.  HOW THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW PROVIDES LITTLE 
PROTECTION 
The law currently provides little recourse to protect publicly available social media 
posts and information from government monitoring. Although the mass gathering 
and analysis of social media data implicates the First and Fourth Amendments, 
current case law does not adequately support the use of either Amendment to curb 
the mass surveillance of social media. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, we have a reasonable expectation of privacy.54 
The reasonable expectation of privacy test was first articulated in the concurrence 
 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See Joseph, supra note 22. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  EPIC v. Department of Homeland Security: Media Monitoring, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/foia/epic-v-dhs-media-monitoring/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 52.  See Elizabeth Stoycheff, Under Surveillance: Examining Facebook’s Spiral of Silence Effects in the Wake of 
NSA Internet Monitoring, 93 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 296, 296–97, 307 (2016). 
 53.  Id. at 299. 
 54.  See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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by Justice Harlan in Katz v. U.S.55 In Katz, the government had placed an electronic 
listening device outside a public phone booth to listen to the defendant’s phone 
conversation.56 The government used the defendant’s side of the conversation as 
evidence in the case over the objection of the defendant.57 Katz argued that the 
phone booth was a constitutionally protected space under the Fourth Amendment; 
the government argued that the phone booth was not constitutionally protected.58 
The Court rejected the parties’ formulation of the issue that focused on whether 
the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area, famously stating “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”59 The Court explained that “What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.60 Based on this formulation of the issue, 
the Court found that “The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied 
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”61 In other words, Katz had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his conversation in the phone booth. Having found that a 
search was conducted, the Court went on to analyze whether the search was 
justifiable under the Constitution and found no justification.62 The Court 
consequently reversed petitioner’s conviction since the search was the basis for it.63 
The majority opinion alluded to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, but 
it was in Justice Harlan’s concurrence that the specific test, as we know it, was 
expressed. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated his understanding of the 
emerging rule used in Katz and prior decisions, stating “that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”64 
As articulated and applied, the reasonable expectation of privacy test does not 
generally extend to information that “a person knowingly exposes to the public.”65 
 
 55.  Id. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 56.  Id. at 348 (majority opinion). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See id. at 351. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) 
 61.  Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
 62.  Id. at 354–59. 
 63.  Id. at 359. 
 64.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 65.  Id. at 351 (majority opinion). 
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Social media posts that lack any security access are freely exposed to the public.66 So, 
although I may have a subjective expectation of privacy in the totality of my public 
social media posts and any information that can be derived from the analysis of my 
social media, this subjective expectation of privacy is not one the courts have 
recognized as accepted by the public.67 
Privacy in digital public space is not only undermined by the current reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, but it is complicated by the Third Party Doctrine, which 
gives no privacy protection to information freely given to a third party. The origins 
of the Third Party Doctrine start with U.S. v. Miller.68 In that case, the defendant, 
Miller, claimed Fourth Amendment protections for his banking records that were 
accessed by the government without a judicial warrant.69 The Court ruled that 
Miller had no Fourth Amendment interest in his bank records that were revealed 
and consequently conveyed to the government by a third party (i.e. the bank).70 The 
Third Party Doctrine was largely solidified in Smith v. Maryland.71 In Smith, the 
Court ruled that the defendant did not have a Fourth Amendment interest in the 
phone numbers he dialed that were consequently passed to the phone company and 
then collected by the government, stating “[t]his Court consistently has held that a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties.”72 
Because social media content is held by the companies that run the social media 
platforms, even social media users who restrict access to their social media content 
will not have Fourth Amendment protections over this information because it is 
held by a third party.73 This fact allows government actors to obtain social media 
information directly from companies without a warrant. Although the Court in 
U.S. v. Jones  began to recognize the problems with the Third Party Doctrine in a 
digital age,74 the cases that estabished the doctrine still remain precedent. 
In U.S. v. Jones, the government installed a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) 
tracking device on a vehicle used by Jones.75 The GPS device was installed on the 
 
 66.  See generally S. Srinivansan, Lack of Privacy Awareness in Social Networks, 6 ISACA J., 2012, AT 1, 2–3 
(explaining that social media privacy is often ignored unwittingly, and that users seem to overlook the 
possibility that personal information could be released to unintended people). 
 67.  See Renee M. Jackson, No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Content Posted to Social Networking 
Websites, Regardless of Individual Privacy Settings, NIXON PEABODY LLP, Oct. 13, 2010, at 1, http://www. 
nixonpeabody.com/files/Employment_Law_Alert_10_13_2010.pdf. 
 68.  See generally 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 69.  Id. at 436. 
 70.  Id. at 445. 
 71.  See generally 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 72.  Id. at 745. 
 73.  See generally Jackson, supra note 67. 
 74.  See generally 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 75.  Id. at 403. 
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vehicle while it was on private property the day after the warrant expired and in 
Maryland instead of the District of Columbia, which is where the warrant 
authorized installation.76 The government subsequently tracked the vehicle for 28 
days.77 The Court reviewed the lower court’s decision that the warrantless 
attachment of the GPS device and subsequent tracking constituted a search and 
violated the Fourth Amendment.78 In the majority opinion by the Court, written by 
Justice Scalia, the Court did not analyze whether a search occurred using the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, instead it used the common-law trespassory 
test.79 Justice Scalia wrote “When the Government physically invades personal 
property to gather information, a search occurs.”80 With respect to collecting the 
same GPS data without a trespass, Justice Scalia suggested “It may be that achieving 
the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to 
answer that question.”81 
Despite the majority opinion in Jones not addressing whether the GPS tracking 
for an extended period of time constituted a search under the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, majority support emerged in the concurrences. Both 
Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor wrote concurrences supporting a reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis that found that the GPS tracking constituted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.82 Justice Alito’s concurrence was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.83 Those four justices combined with Justice 
Sotomayor constitute what has been referred to as a “shadow” majority since the 
reasoning in the concurrences was not the basis of the majority opinion, but does 
suggest that the Court would have considered long-term GPS tracking a search 
under the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 
Both the Alito concurrence and Sotomayor concurrence show concern for the 
prospect of conducting the same exact gathering of GPS data as in the present case 
but without any physical intrusion.84 But, it is Justice Sotomayor who acknowledges 
the growing issue of the Third Party Doctrine in our digital society, stating:  
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 404 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 79.  Id. at 409. 
 80.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 414. 
 81.  Id. at 412. 
 82.  Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 418–19 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 83.  Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 84.  Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 418–19 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks.85 
This indication that the Court should reconsider the Third Party Doctrine is a 
step in the right direction, if only a very minor one. Unfortunately, social media 
information freely exposed to the public may need more than new precedent that 
overturns the Third Party Doctrine. In the cases that established the Third Party 
Doctrine, the data in question was only given to a distinct and definable third party, 
leaving room to distinguish social media data because of the fact it is freely exposed 
to the public. On the other hand, many of the risks associated with GPS tracking 
highlighted by Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence are applicable to social media 
monitoring. For example, in Jones, Justice Sotomayor acknowledges the chilling 
effect to First Amendment associational and expressive freedoms.86  A similar 
chilling effect occurs with social media monitoring that analyzes everything you say 
and everyone you are connected to on social media. 
The current trends exposed by social media monitoring, including sophisticated 
algorithms to analyze not only the social media connections but the publicly 
available content requires more robust protections if we are to provide adequate 
protections for our First Amendment rights. Merely protecting the associations will 
not be enough when the expressions are also the subject of large-scale collection 
and analysis. 
VI.  TO FILL THE VACUUM, COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT AND NEW 
REGULATION ARE NEEDED 
Given the expansiveness of the monitoring of social media, and the increasing 
surveillance and analysis of other publicly available data across the country, the 
installation of community oversight at the local level and baseline protection at the 
federal level are essential. 
Regulations that allow for better community oversight of current and new 
surveillance technologies are necessary to appropriately protect our privacy and 
First Amendment rights. Furthermore, regulation is also needed at the federal level 
to provide baseline protections against unfettered government analysis of social 
media and other publicly available data (particularly digital data). 
City councils across the country would be wise to look at the Surveillance and 
Community Safety Ordinance being considered in Oakland, California. The 
ordinance recently and unanimously passed out of Oakland’s Privacy Advisory 
 
 85.  Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 86.  565 U.S. at 416. 
SCOTT PP v4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2017  4:08 PM 
 Social Media and Government Surveillance 
162 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
Commission and is currently up for consideration by the Oakland City Council.87 
The Surveillance and Community Safety Ordinance represents a model law to 
address the increasing use of surveillance and provides a framework for combating 
the unnecessary introduction or overly expansive use of new mass surveillance 
technology like social media monitoring.88 The Oakland ordinance arose out of 
“Oakland’s effort to build the Domain Awareness Center, a city-wide surveillance 
hub that would have monitored people’s activities from a variety of cameras and 
sensors.”89 
There are a number of important features in the ordinance to ensure that public 
mass surveillance technologies are included within its purview, that public input is 
considered, and that safeguards are put in place prior to deployment of new 
surveillance technology. 
First, the Oakland ordinance recognizes that even the collection of purely 
publicly available data needs to be addressed. The ordinance allows for scrutiny of 
surveillance “technology which aggregates publicly available information” as such 
technologies “ha[ve] the potential to reveal a wealth of detail about a person’s 
familial, political, professional, religious, or sexual associations.”90 Social media 
monitoring is clearly a “technology which aggregates publicly available 
information.”91 
Second, “meaningful public input” on “how surveillance technologies should be 
funded, acquired, or used” is required.92 And, the expectation is that the public’s 
opinion will be “given significant weight.”93 Such discussions beforehand allow the 
community impacted by mass surveillance technology to clearly define their 
expectation of privacy. 
Third, “legally enforceable safeguards, including robust transparency, oversight, 
and accountability measures must be in place . . . before any surveillance technology 
is deployed.”94 Often where new surveillance technology is incorporated, there are 
not enough measures put in place to ensure appropriate usage of the technology. 
 
  87.       Cyrus Farivar, Oakland May Become Rare American City With Strict Rules for Spy Gear Use, 
ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/01/oakland-may-become-the-rare-
american-city-with-strict-rules-for-spy-gear-use. 
 88.  See Oakland, Cal., The Surveillance and Community Safety Ordinance (Jan. 5, 2016) (Draft), 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/cityadministrator/documents/report/oak062224.pdf. 
 89.  Darwin BondGraham, Oakland Privacy Commission Approves Surveillance Transparency and Oversight 
Law, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2017/ 
01/06/oakland-privacy-commission-approves-surveillance-transparency-and-oversight-law. 
 90.  Oakland, Cal., The Surveillance and Community Safety Ordinance (Jan. 5, 2016) (Draft), 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/cityadministrator/documents/report/oak062224.pdf. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
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Incorporating transparency, oversight, and accountability measures upfront helps 
prevent new surveillance technology from expanding beyond its originally stated 
use. To assist with the transparency and oversight, the Oakland ordinance requires 
data reporting that allows the public and the city council “to verify that mandated 
civil rights and civil liberties safeguards have been strictly adhered to.”95 
At the federal level, a straightforward regulation should be implemented that 
requires a warrant to perform data analysis of information collected through mass 
public surveillance.  
New regulation would make clear that indiscriminate social media monitoring 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and a violation of First 
Amendment freedoms, thus providing individuals a means to challenge authorities 
who improperly monitor the social media account of an individual. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Even considering the amount of data that is already gathered about us on a daily 
basis, we are still at the beginning of the datafication of our lives and analysis of that 
data. Social media monitoring is the current example of the perils to our democracy 
posed by the gathering and analyzing of data from public spaces. There will be 
more. If we are to maintain a viable democracy, it is paramount that we consider 
the consequences of mass surveillance and analysis—including and especially of our 
public space—which lacks protections to preserve any sense of privacy in public.
 
 95.  Id. 
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